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7.1  Introduction 
Employed black youths earn roughly the same wages as white youths 
(Freeman and Wise 1982). Thus, at least as far as wages are concerned, 
the disadvantage faced by black youths in the labor market is not that 
they obtain worse jobs than white youths do, but that white youths 
seem to be able to find jobs with greater ease (Clark and Summers 
1982). Counter to conventional wisdom, Ellwood (in this volume) has 
shown that this difference does not arise from patterns of  residential 
and employment location.  Rather, it appears that a good deal of the 
explanation has to do with the relative position of black youths in the 
hiring queue: they are more often at the rear or excluded altogether. 
This study will investigate some possible reasons why black youths 
may appear less attractive to employers and will also suggest possible 
methods of improving their relative standing. 
Justifiable or not, black youths have a collective reputation as the 
least dependable and least productive demographic group in the labor 
force. Analysis of  data in the Current Population Survey shows that 
there  is a  statistically  significant difference  in  absenteeism between 
black  and white youths,  with the black  youths absent more  often.' 
Thus, even in  the absence of a residual preference for hiring white 
youths, it is not surprising that black youths might appear less attractive 
to potential employers, other things being equal. If their negative rep- 
utation as a group plays an important role in the treatment of individual 
black youths, information that aids employers in the screening process 
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should reduce this statistical discrimination, thereby helping deserving 
black youngsters to be treated more fairly. Similarly, measures that 
induce black youngsters collectively to improve their conduct might 
gradually erode their negative reputation and their poor position in the 
queue. 
Some analysts (Anderson 1980, for example) argue that the conduct 
of  inner-city black youths is more sensitive to the quality of the jobs 
they hold than is the behavior of other youths.  Thus, it is reasoned, 
various forms of job upgrading may go a long way toward producing 
more job commitment and conformity to accepted standards of conduct 
on the part of black youths. Others (Banfield 1974, for example), how- 
ever, are highly sceptical of that view and believe that the employment 
behavior of inner-city youths is too tied to educational deficiencies and 
environmental factors for job quality to have a substantial influence. 
There is little scientific evidence (especially in the economics literature) 
regarding the sensitivity of  this population’s behavior to various in- 
centives, including the attractiveness of the jobs they hold. 
Absenteeism is one of a range of behaviors that reflect a worker’s 
attitude and commitment to his job and perceptions of his value as an 
employee. This study attempts to gauge the effects ofjob characteristics 
and personal background  factors on absenteeism from work  among 
inner-city black men between the ages of  16 and 24. The study places 
central emphasis on the effect ofjob quality. The results provide strong 
evidence that job quality does affect absenteeism, but in a more com- 
plicated way than is usually supposed. 
The results show that many direct and indirect job benefits, such as 
the wage paid and the amount of prestige attached to the job, reduce 
the incidence of absenteeism markedly. On the other hand, both the- 
oretical and empirical results suggest that a rational worker may be 
absent more often, other things being equal, the greater the marketa- 
bility of the skills he has learned on the job and the greater the value 
of  his experience as a signal to future employers. Hence, if  a “dead 
end” job is defined as one that adds little or nothing to a worker’s 
stock of  human capital, less dead-end jobs may in fact produce less 
reliable workers. 
For empirical purposes, less dead-end jobs will be represented by 
jobs in which there is a higher probability of a long-term attachment 
to the industry in which the worker is employed. The presumption is 
that among occupations held by inner-city black youths, those that lead 
to a high level of industry attachment do so by developing industry- 
specific human capital and hence more  security and mobility within 
the industry. There is, of course, an alternative interpretation, namely, 
the lack of interindustry mobility could imply a more dead-end job if 
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or advancement. This explanation seems unlikely, however, since in- 
dustry retention rates are in fact highly positively correlated with the 
desirable characteristics of both jobs and workers. Given this definition, 
developed and defended below, reducing the dead-end nature of a job 
will enhance the worker’s welfare but may increse his absenteeism. 
Finally, it  is found  that  the  various job characteristics  discussed 
above (as well as the length of the commuting time to the job and the 
style of supervision) are as important as, and perhaps more important 
than, employee characteristics in determining absenteeism. Among em- 
ployee characteristics, directly measured personality and aptitudes have 
significant explanatory power. But once these are controlled for, more 
general environmental and family background variables appear to add 
little to our ability to understand absenteeism. 
Data for the study come from the 1979-80  NBER Survey of Inner- 
City Black Youth. The survey provides a myriad of data on the daily 
activities, personality, family, environment, academic background, and 
labor market of each of over 2,300 black men aged 16 to 24. The youths 
surveyed were randomly selected from city blocks that, according to 
the 1970 Census, had at least 70 percent black residents and 30 percent 
families below the poverty line in income. Those studied for the present 
report are the approximately 70 percent who held regular jobs for ten 
days or more at some time during the year preceding the interview. 
Absenteeism on the most recent job is the primary subject of analysis. 
Other data sets that contain measures of absenteeism are not nearly 
as rich as the NBER youth data in their coverage of important job and 
worker characteristics. Thus, the NBER data enable the elimination 
of  more sources of  possible omitted-variables bias. Still, the NBER 
data are less than ideal and impose certain constraints on the scope 
and method of the analysis. First, the measure of absenteeism is ordinal 
rather than cardinal: each respondent was asked whether he was never, 
rarely, sometimes, or often absent not because of  illness; absent due 
to illness; or tardy. Although the current study focuses on absenteeism 
not due to illness, estimates for absenteeism due to illness and tardiness 
will also be discussed. 
The second limitation imposed by the data is that, since they cover 
only black men between 16 and 24 years of age, important comparisons 
with other demographic groups are not possible. Third, the data are 
cross-sectional, so the same worker cannot be observed  in different 
employment settings. This leaves the interpretation that there is a strong 
causal link between job characteristics and absenteeism open to the 
criticism that some part of the influence we attribute to job character- 
istics is really the result of unobserved worker characteristics that affect 
both  absenteeism and the quality of  the job that the individual can 
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that unobserved worker characteristics are an important source of bias 
in this study. 
There are very few absenteeism studies by economists with which 
to compare the current ~ndertaking.~  This is somewhat surprising, since 
roughly as many hours are lost each year due to absenteeism as from 
strikes and layoffs in  the U.S.  economy. Allen  (1981b) conducted a 
study of absenteeism, using the 1972-73  Quality of  Employment Sur- 
vey (QES), in which he included race as one of several personal char- 
acteristics in a cross-sectional analysis. His results were similar to those 
of this study insofar as he found that job characteristics affect absen- 
teeism and that “most easily observable personal characteristics [were] 
unrelated to work attendance” when important  job characteristics were 
held constant. Allen also found that race had no statistically significant 
impact on absenteeism. This finding, he claimed, was “not at all con- 
sistent with ‘vicious circle of poverty’ or ‘ghetto pathology’ theories 
of nonwhite vocational behavior.” Observed differences between white 
and nonwhite adults could largely be accounted for by differences in 
marginal earnings, scheduling flexibility, and health. Although there 
were differences in the specific job characteristics analyzed, Allen’s 
finding that job characteristics play a decisive role in affecting employee 
behavior is consistent with the findings reported below. Unfortunately, 
the QES data set used by Allen did not include sufficient numbers of 
youths to judge whether his findings would extend to young people as 
well as adults. 
This paper proceeds first through a simple expositional model, then 
presents comparative statics that describe the effects of variations in 
wages, status, and security on absenteeism. From there, variables used 
in the empirical analysis are defined, and a summary is given of parts 
of the analysis for which quantitative results are not reported here. In 
particular, a long list of  personality and environmental variables that 
did not affect absenteeism directly is summarized. Empirical estimates 
are then given for both ordinary least squares (OLS) and ordered probit 
coefficients from the absenteeism equation. The quantitative effect on 
absenteeism of variation in each of the independent variables is dis- 
cussed. Job quality and worker characteristcs are found to be of similar 
quantitative importance. Finally, the major findings are reviewed and 
some of their implications are discussed. 
The decision to skip work is a time allocation decision reflecting a 
balancing of  the costs and benefits of  alternative uses of time. Some 
common inducements for employees to skip work are that they are 
sick, they have other “business”  (such as a job search or other income 
opportunities) to take care of, they wish to engage in  some form of 
leisure, or they desire to avoid some unpleasantness in the work en- 
vironment. On the other hand, incentives to avoid, or the costs of, 265  Do Better Jobs Make Better Workers? 
absenteeism include lost pay, the possible embarrassment of later being 
questioned or reprimanded, a lower probability of promotion, and the 
possibility of being fired from the job. The conceptual foundation and 
empirical analysis of this paper rests on all of these costs and benefits 
of  absenteeism.  For  expository  simplicity, however,  the  theoretical 
model in  the next  section will focus on leisure consumption as the 
benefit from increased absenteeism and forgone earnings and the risk 
ofjob loss as the costs. In addition, explicit consideration of variations 
in tastes and environments will be deferred until after the following 
section, which may  be passed  over by  the less  technically  inclined 
reader. 
7.2  A Theoretical Model of  Absenteeism 
The view of the labor market underlying the behavioral model pre- 
sented in this section is best characterized as a job search-turnover 
model. The distribution of workers across jobs at any given time results 
from matches made in the past. Due to imperfect information, costs 
of  adjustment,  and risk  aversion, recontracting does not  take place 
continually in order to adjust instantaneously to every change in market 
 condition^.^  Thus, at any particular time, identical  people  may  not 
achieve exactly identical levels of utility, and every worker may not 
be employed at what would be his or her globally optimal position if 
the conditions of the standard competitive model held absolutely. 
This analytical perspective highlights the fact that even when dif- 
ferences in taktes and personality can be effectively controlled, there 
may remain differences in job situations that can lead to differences in 
behavior. Youths with similar tastes and abilities may differ in how well 
they like their jobs. Thus, there may be behavioral differences that are 
unrelated to tastes and personal characteristics. 
An approach that would be consistent with a static competitive model 
would be to assume that a worker chooses simultaneously his job and 
his expected behavior on that job. The model here, however, assumes 
that these choices are basically sequential, with the worker first taking 
the best available job that he knows of (providing, of course, that that 
job is above his reservation standard of acceptability) and then deciding 
on appropriate behavior on that job as a function of how much he likes 
the job and how much he would mind losing it. The quality of the best 
available job is measured in terms of the wage it pays, the status it 
offers, the skills it teaches, and so on and is not a choice variable (aside 
from conventional considerations of  optimal length and intensity of 
search). It is given by current market conditions and employers’ impres- 
sions of the applicant, each of which the applicant has no real control 
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the choice of job, takes job characteristics as given, and focuses on 
the decision regarding how much to be absent as  a function of the three 
job characteristics most commonly  examined  in  studies of  minority 
youth employment problems: wages, status, and the dead-end nature 
of jobs (or the opportunity to acquire useful human capital). 
7.2.1  A Two-Period Model 
The rewards of work include psychic benefits and income that en- 
ables the worker to purchase commodities to enhance the quality of 
leisure time. Additionally, there are various ways in which working in 
the present helps to enhance prospects for a happy future. To  look 
more closely at aspects of the labor-leisure decision that will be at the 
center of the empirical analysis, let us consider a two-period model in 
which  a worker wishes to maximize the sum of present plus future 
utilities.  Currrent-period  consumption of leisure in this model is bal- 
anced against two categories of costs: forgone income and a reduction 
in the expected value of future utility. 
On most jobs there is some agreement, usually  explicit, regarding 
how many hours per week a worker is expected to work unless he is 
ill. Say that this number is 40 and that 40 is the maximum number of 
hours one can work on the job under consideration. In this model, 
when a worker chooses to work fewer than 40 hours, he risks forfeiting 
the chance to work for his current employer in the fiturc, that is, he 
risks being fired. If he loses his job he will either find another job or 
become unemployed. 
An objective function can be specified to represent the sum of present 
plus expected future utilities. Let U,,  represent the current-period util- 
ity, which captures the enjoyment that comes from current consumption 
of leisure (L),  status (S),  and income (Y).  Income (Y)  is the product 
of the hourly wage rate (w)  and the number of hours (T)  per week that 
the worker chooses to work, such that T  = 40 - L. If  K  represents 
the degree to which the job teaches specific skills, then U1,  becomes: 
= Ui,  (Llw,S,K). 
The expected value of future utility is the sum of two terms. uzb is 
the utility the worker will experience in the future if  he loses his job 
and has to find another or becomes ~nemployed.~  There is a known 
probability (P)  that a worker will lose his job. P can be influenced by 
his behavior on the  job and may also be a function ofjob characteristics. 
If the worker is not laid off or fired, and if  the second-period utility 
(UZJ  of staying with his current employer exceeds Uz6,  then he will 
remain with his first employer. This will occur with probability  1 -  P. 
Hence, the two terms whose sum represents the expected value of the 
second-period or future utility are: Puzb and (1 -  P)Uz,. Some rear- 267  Do Better Jobs Make Better Workers? 
rangement allows the sum to be written:  U,, - P(U,, - &b).  Com- 
parative statics will be carried out below under the assumption that 
U,, > u2b. U,, and uzb  will be treated as exogenous insofar as they 
will  be  unaffected  by  the worker’s  choice of  how  much  leisure to 
consume in  the first period.  On the other hand, various exogenous 
forces can cause U,, and u2b  to change in ways that affect the inter- 
temporal trade-off embodied in the current period labor-leisure deci- 
sion, thereby affecting the optimal choice of  first-period leisure, L*. 
For expository ease assume that the worker’s rate of time preference 
is zero, so that his two-period expected utility can be expressed as: 
(1)  E(u)  = u10 +  u2u -  P(u2, - u2b)* 
Maximization by choice of current leisure (L)  gives the following 
first-order  condition, where  superscripts will  be used  throughout to 
indicate the variable(s) with respect to which the derivatives have been 
taken: 
(2)  EL(U)  = U?, - Uf,W -  PL(U,, - U2J 
= 0 whenL = L*, 
where Uf,  >  0, Ul’, >  0  and PL >  0. (Assume that U,, is quasi-concave 
and that PLL  is nonnegative. This ensures that ELL < 0.) 
The first-order condition in equation (2) can now be totally differ- 
entiated to explore the impact of exogenous forces on the optimal level 
of leisure consumption in  period  1. The following three comparative 
static experiments provide a basis for several of the interpretations in 
the empirical‘  section that follows. 
7.2.2  Comparative Statics 
From the perspective of  a youth who has found a job that satisfies 
or exceeds his minimal requirements, the characteristics of the job can 
be taken as given parameters. This subsection will examine the com- 
parative static implications of  changes in three job characteristics of 
particular interest. The wage, status, and skill contents of a job are 
probably the three most important aspects of job quality determining 
attractiveness to inner-city black youths. Discussions of the demeaning 
aspects of  “menial” jobs focus on the facts that these jobs pay low 
wages, attract little respect from society at large, and teach few skills 
that might lead to employment security and upward social mobility.6 
Advocates of the provision of better jobs for minority youths argue 
that jobs  with  higher wages,  greater  status, and more  training  will 
induce more stable and acceptable behavior. The following comparative 
static experiments examine whether or not these predictions hold true 
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Case 1.  Wages 
In this case we analyze the impact on L*  of  an increase in wages 
(w).  The question that interests  us  here  is how  a worker’s optimal 
leisure might differ on two jobs that differ only in that  one pays  a 
slightly higher wage both in the present and the future. Both U1,  and 
U,,  are thus affected. 
If we apply the implicit-function theorem to equation (2) and assume 
that the appropriate second-order condition (ELL  < 0) holds, the sign 
of L*w,  which gives the direction of the impact of w upon L*,  must be 
the same as the  sign of  EL”. Hence, we  need  only to examine the 
following equation: 
(3)  sgn L*w = sgn[UfTT - UIY,wT - UIY, 
-  PLu?a - PLw(  u2a  - u2b)]. 
This expression does not have an unambiguous sign. Ufz is positive 
because an increase in income enhances the marginal utility of leisure, 
and -  U,Y,wT is positive under the usual assumption of the diminishing 
marginal utility of income. These two terms together represent forces 
pushing toward more consumption of  leisure (absenteeism) at higher 
wages. In situations in which these terms dominate, workers are said 
to be on the backward-bending portion of  their labor-supply curves. 
Readers who believe that most inner-city youths work to achieve target 
current incomes with little or no concern for future earnings should 
expect these terms to exceed the sum of the absolute values of the 
other terms in equation (3) and therefore to produce an empirical finding 
that higher wages lead to greater consumption of leisure. 
Forces pulling in the opposite direction are captured by -  U;,  and 
-  PLUy, and probably by -  PLw(U2a  - &).  If a nonzero rate of time 
preference were in the model, it would multiply the last two terms. 
The greater a worker’s concern for the future relative to the present, 
the stronger the influence of -  PLUya,  which, other things equal, influ- 
ences him to consume less leisure as w rises. Similarly, the greater the 
first-period marginal utility of income (Uya),  the more likely the worker 
will be on the upward-sloping section of his labor-supply curve. Finally, 
it is likely that after controlling for other job and personal character- 
istics, we will find that employers paying higher wages can more easily 
replace discharged workers and will therefore be less tolerant of ab- 
senteeism, rendering -  PLw  negative. Which forces are in fact stronger, 
the negative or the positive, is an empirical question that will be an- 
swered by the statistical analysis below. 
Case 2.  Status 
In the United States “you  are what you do.”  A major component 
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cupation derives from the status or respectability of the occupation in 
the eyes of society at large. When someone accepts a job that pays 
less money than some alternative opportunity, it is often the case that 
he is trading income for prestige. It is in the same spirit to hypothesize 
that people  also pay for status through  the forfeiture  of leisure.  An 
example would be someone who is absent from work less on a higher- 
status job because he is more concerned about losing the  job, and with 
it his social standing,  than he would  be on a lower-status job. The 
notion that status has a positive impact on utility is captured in the 
model by the assumption that both U1,  and U,,  are increasing functions 
of the status associated with the worker's current job. 
An additional effect of status is likely to be that the higher the status 
of the job, the lower the marginal disutility of work. On a more pres- 
tigious job workers can be expected to feel better about themselves. 
They will therefore feel less demeaned while doing the job and may 
even miss it more when absent. This phenomenon can be embedded 
in the model through the assumption that the higher the status of the 
job, the lower the marginal utility of being absent. This can be repre- 
sented symbolically as U+2 < 0, where S  = status. 
For some purposes it is useful to think of status as a component of 
real  income.  One such instance is  when  investigating the effect  of 
additional  status on the marginal  utility  of  money  income.  The as- 
sumption of a diminishing marginal utility of real income leads to the 
conclusion  that added status reduces the marginal  utility  of  money 
income Y (at constant prices). Symbolically, this can be written as Uys 
<  0. This conclusion follows as long as status and purchased consumer 
goods are to some extent substitutes. 
It is almost  certainly  true that there are systematic variations  in 
personnel practices across jobs of differing levels of status and that a 
dimension of these variations is a difference in the effect of absenteeism 
on the probability of being fired. In other words, it should be assumed 
that PLS#  0. Unfortunately, however, the sign of PLs could plausibly 
be either positive or negative. 
Assuming that Uf2  < 0, Ug, > 0,  Ur2 < 0, und PLS#O,  the follow- 
ing equation expresses the marginal effect of status on optimal leisure 
(L"): 
(4)  sgn L*s = sgn[Uf2 - wUr2 - PLU% - PLS(U2,  - Udl. 
Although it deserves a place in the formal analysis,  U;:  should be 
expected to be very  small for inner-city black  youths and therefore 
unlikly to be decisive in determining the sign of equation (4). If PLs is 
positive (or sufficiently small in absolute value if  negative), the sign of 
L*s will be negative, implying that higher  status produces lower ab- 
senteeism. But if  employers providing higher-status jobs are substan- 
tially more tolerant of absenteeism (PLs  is both negative  and of sub- 270  Ronald FergusodRandall Filer 
stantial magnitude), L*s may be positive. Thus, the actual effect of job 
status on absenteeism remains a question for empirical study. 
Case 3.  Skills 
Consider a variable K  that represents the level of industry-specific 
human capital embodied in a worker. Such capital may be accumulated 
through on-the-job experience, through organized training, or through 
both. In general, the more K a worker has, the more costly it is to find 
someone to replace him. One should therefore expect that firms are 
less prone to fire people for marginal increases in absenteeism in jobs 
in which the level of K tends to be high than in jobs in which K tends 
to be low. In other words, one should expect PLK  to be negative for 
most industries. 
If there is any systematic effect of K on job satisfaction, it is likely 
to be  positive, since workers are more  likely to enjoy  skilled than 
unskilled work. Other things equal, the marginal utility of being absent 
is lower when direct enjoyment from work is higher, such that Uff  < 
0, and Up, >  0 in equation (5)  below. These terms are directly analogous 
to Uf2  and Uf,  in equation (4). In both equations (4)  and (9,  these 
terms represent forces pulling absenteeism (leisure) downward. 
In equation (3,  however, Upa is more than offset by U&, which pulls 
in the opposite direction. It is reasonable to assume in a model like 
this, in which the current period is implicitly very short and the menu 
of opportunities fixed, that the difference UZa  -  U2b  is positive. Never- 
theless, U2, -  u2b is not the same across all types of people and jobs. 
People  with  industry-specific  skills will  generally  have employment 
alternatives that differ less from their current jobs than the alternatives 
of most people without such skills. Thus, in most situations the dif- 
ference  U2, - u2b  will be a decreasing function of K: (U2, - U2b)K 
< 0. Encapsulating the discussion of the last few paragraphs, equation 
(5)  gives the sign of the impact of K on L*, such that: 
(5)  sgn LeK  =  sgn [  Uff -  PLK  (U,, -  u2b) -  PL(  U2,  -  U2JK1. 
To summarize, equation (5)  shows that the forces affecting the impact 
of K on a worker’s absenteeism are of three general types: the pleasure 
of  working on a job at which he is skilled; the lower probability  of 
being fired for an incremental increase in absenteeism, since he can 
less easily be replaced; and the fact that the greater his endowment of 
specific skills, the better his alternatives relative to his current job, and 
hence the less he  will  suffer if  he  is fired. The first type implies a 
negative influence of K upon absenteeism, while the second and third 
imply positive effects. As with the wage rate (w)  and status (S),  the 
sign of the influence of K on L cannot be ascertained through theory 
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The claim that the provision of better jobs will automatically induce 
better behavior on the part of inner-city black youths is not a conclusion 
that  can be reached directly from microeconomic theory and must, 
therefore, rest on empirical verification. For the three variables w,  S, 
and K,  comparative statics have shown the main forces that might cause 
absenteeism to increase or decrease with improvement in job quality. 
The estimated results will distinguish which forces dominate. 
7.3  Variable Definitions 
The model presented in section 7.2 provides the conceptual foun- 
dation of  the empirical analysis that follows. A primary goal of the 
analysis is to establish whether and to what degree the three dimensions 
of job quality studied above affect absenteeism among members of the 
NBER data set. To  accomplish this, we must hold constant other job 
characteristics  and personality factors that  affect  absenteeism.  The 
variables employed for this purpose will be defined below. First, how- 
ever, the three job-quality measures of primary  interest-those  cor- 
responding to w,  S, and K above-will  be introduced. 
7.3.1 
Two of the three job characteristics in the model above have close 
empirical counterparts.  A measure of hourly salary (HRSAL) on the 
worker’s most recent job has been constructed from the NBER data 
set by simply dividing weekly before-tax earnings by hours worked for 
each youth in‘ the sample. To arrive at a measure of job status, three- 
digit census occupation codes, based on what the respondent said he 
made or did, have been matched  with the Duncan index that ranks 
occupational codes by socioeconomic status. The Duncan index has 
been widely employed in the social science literature and is commonly 
accepted as a measure of how Americans perceive the relative status 
of occupations. For each young man in the sample the value of  the 
variable STATUS equals the value of the Duncan index for his reported 
occupation. 
Besides HRSAL (w)  and STATUS (S),  the third job characteristic in 
the model above is K,  which is used to indicate each worker’s level of 
industry-specific skill. Although there is no widely accepted measure 
of K, there is a relatively new index that comes as close as any we 
know of to capturing what K represents. Consider the following ques- 
tions:  Why will young people in  some occupations  remain affiliated 
with one industry over much of their adult lives, while others will not? 
What  do those  who stay within their respective  industries  have in 
common, and how do they differ systematically from otherwise similar 
young people who move around from one industry to another? 
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Clearly,  there are many  narrow and specific answers that can be 
posited to explain behavior in particular industries and occupations. In 
general, however, besides the possibility that “stable” workers are less 
desirable workers and hence “locked into” their jobs (an explanation 
dismissed elsewhere in this paper), there seems to be only one over- 
arching  explanation  for the  systematic patterns we observe: young 
people in occupations in which industry-specific skills are developed 
will tend to retain affiliations with the industries in  which their skills 
are most valuable. On the other hand, workers who find it necessary 
or desirable to move from industry to industry are likely to have less 
of a comparative advantage in what they are doing for a living at any 
particular time. They are therefore likely to be easier to replace and 
to feel less sure of landing jobs as satisfying as the ones they have if 
they lose them. In other words, they will have higher values of  U2(,  - 
This explanation is reinforced by the fact that in certain industries, 
prospective employers gain valuable information if  they know that a 
job applicant has worked in a job similar to the one for which  he is 
applying.  In addition  to specific  skills, previous experience can be 
assumed to have provided the applicant with better information about 
the attributes of the job than is available to other members of the labor 
force, and therefore to increase the probability  that the applicant  is 
better suited to the job than a randomly selected individual. The value 
of this information will differ systematically across occupations, being 
higher  where the cost of  poor worker-to-job  matches is  higher and 
where the1 perception among the general public concerning what the 
job entails is vague or inaccurate. This effect, together With  the de- 
velopment of industry-specific skill, is surely what most often explains 
the prolonged  industry attachment observed for members of certain 
occupations. They combine to give workers greater security and intra- 
industry mobility. 
Brown (1982) has computed an index from the  1970 Census 11’100 
file, using three-digit occupation codes and young men with fewer than 
ten years of work experience, that ranks each occupation by the prob- 
ability that a worker in the occupation will be in the same industry at 
two observations in time five years apart. This index is thus a ranking 
of occupations by industry retention rates and hence is an appropriate 
measure to  represent the variable K.  It is important to realize that these 
are industry, not firm, retention rates. Indeed, among the young work- 
ers analyzed by Brown and in the current study, very few remained 
with a single employer for anything approaching five years.* Brown’s 
index has been matched with our sample, and in the analysis below it 
will be represented by  a  variable called SPECSKILL, for industry- 
specific skill. The most common occupations held by members of the 
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NBER sample, along with the corresponding values of STATUS, SPEC- 
SKILL, and mean values of HRSAL, are listed in table 7.1. 
7.3.2  Other Job Characteristics 
The NBER data set permits examination of several other job char- 
acteristics besides those discussed above. These include the respon- 
dent’s perception of whether his boss shows prejudice or favoritism; 
how long, on average, it takes to learn the job; whether the job is part 
of a government program (such as CETA); the boss’s race; and whether 
the workplace is unionized.  This  study tests all of  these in  various 
empirical specifications. 
The only variable from this list found to bear a significant relationship 
to absenteeism was the respondent’s perception of whether his boss 
showed “prejudice or favoritism to people on things other than how 
well  they  (do/did) on their job.”  In  the results reported  below this 
variable is called BOSSBIAS. BOSSBIAS equals one for biased bosses 
and zero for unbiased bosses. Regressions including the other job char- 
acteristics listed above (added both collectively and individually to the 
specifications reported  below) show statistically  insignificant coeffi- 
cients and leave the pattern of signs and statistical significance reported 
below intact. Having been listed here, they therefore will not be further 
discussed. An interesting aside, however, is that although the race of 
the boss has little independent effect on absenteeism, it is highly cor- 
related with BOSSBIAS. The percentages reporting biased bosses were 
15.7 for those with black bosses, 26.0 for those with white bosses, 20.0 
for those with Hispanic bosses, and 14.0 for those with bosses of other 
races. The numbers of respondents reporting bias were 99, 172, 5,  and 
6 in the four boss’s race categories, respectively. 
An additional job characteristic is the length of the commute to work 
in minutes. Clearly, one would expect that the longer or more arduous 
the journey to work, the more often a person might choose not to go. 
This is included in the analysis below under the label COMMUTE.  The 
mode of  commuting was included in  a regression  not reported here. 
Its estimated influence was small and statistically insignificant. 
7.3.3  The Opportunity Costs of Time at Work 
The literature on men in the age bracket under consideration here 
(16 to 24 years old) tends to emphasize two categories of leisure time 
activity: illegal activity and “hanging out” with friends. To capture the 
opportunity cost associated with illegal activity, we  included  in the 
regressions a dummy variable called ILLEGAL, which takes on a value 
of one if  the respondent reported having received an average of more 
than one dollar per week of income from illegal sources during the year 274  Ronald FergusodRandall Filer 
Table 7.1  Most Common Occupations of NBER Survey Respondents 
Average 
1970  Hourly 
Occupation  Census  Sample  Duncan  Retention  Wage 
Title  Code  Size  Index  Index  (STD.) 




































































































































Note: Included are all occupations containing 20 or more individuals in the NBER sample. 
STD = standard deviation. 275  Do Better Jobs Make Better Workers? 
before the survey. Fourteen percent of the sample fall into the group 
for whom ILLEGAL equals one. 
To  capture the effect of peer group “street activity,” we constructed 
a variable for the level of employment among close friends. Each re- 
spondent was asked whether it was true, somewhat true, or not at all 
true, that “most of your friends are unemployed.” The variable PEERS 
formed from this question had no perceptible relationship to absentee- 
ism. Both simple correlation coefficients and coefficients estimated in 
multivariate contexts concurred. PEERS was therefore omitted from 
the regressions whose results are reported below. In those in which it 
was included, it had virtually no impact on the estimated coefficients 
for the other independent variables. 
7.3.4  Personality and Personal Background 
An exhaustive array of personality and personal background mea- 
sures is indispensable in determining whether the coefficients estimated 
for HRSAL, STATUS, and SPECSKILL reflect the true effects of job 
variation rather than the effects of omitted personality measures. For- 
tunately, the NBER data set contains such an array. 
More than 20  personality and personal background measures were 
tested, both  all at once and in a number  of different combinations. 
Except for the small group whose estimates were consistently statis- 
tically significant, and which are inlcuded in the results reported below, 
the inclusion of these additional variables had  virtually no effect on 
the estimated coefficients and t-statistics of  HRSAL, STATUS, and 
SPECSKILL;.  these independent variables had  small estimated coef- 
ficients and produced t-statistics that seldom exceeded  1.0. To check 
that multicollinearity was not the problem, we tested the variables that 
typically showed up as insignificant one at a time with the specification 
for which estimates are reported below. None was statistically signif- 
icant at or near conventionally accepted levels. 
The variables of particular interest that had no significant influence 
on absenteeism were marital status; the personal importance of religion 
and the frequency of church attendance; agreement or disagreement 
with the belief that “if you work hard and get a good education you’ll 
get ahead in America”; peer group employment status; age; and several 
family background  measures,  such as whether there was a working 
adult in the home when the respondent was  14 years old, whether at 
age  14 he lived with both parents, one parent, or someone else, and 
whether he lived at home at the time of the NBER interview. 
In addition to ILLEGAL, which was discussed above, four variables 
in the personality and personal background category stand apart from 
those listed in the previous paragraph by having an important impact 
on absenteeism.  They  are grades, voter  registration  status, the  re- 276  Ronald FergusodRandall Filer 
spondent’s perception of the difficulty of finding another job if he had 
to, and the number of years of education completed. Apparently, these 
four variables capture the dominant personality and background traits 
that are quantitatively important determinants of job attendance. It is 
highly unlikely that there is some other omitted variable that substan- 
tially affects absenteeism and is not highly correlated with at least one 
of the personality and background variables tested. 
As  a  basis  for  the  variable  GRADES, respondents  were  asked 
whether in the last year of school completed they earned mostly As, 
half  As  and half  B’s, mostly  B’s,  and  so on.  GRADES thus takes 
on seven values in  our analysis, ranging from 7 for mostly A’s to  1 
for  mostly  D’s  and  below.  The logical connection  of  GRADES  to 
absenteeism is straightforward: people who earn high grades are usu- 
ally more self-disciplined, more conformist, more apt to achieve suc- 
cess  through  conventional channels,  and more  eager to  please  au- 
thority figures. Each of  these tendencies weighs against the probability 
of  engaging in  frivolous  absenteeism.  GRADES  may  also  indicate 
more  intelligence  and  therefore  individuals  who  both  perceive  the 
consequences of  irresponsible behavior and have lower rates of  time 
preference,  making  them  more  concerned  with  the  future  conse- 
quences of current actions. 
Being registered  as a voter indicates that one has accepted  some 
measure of  adult responsibility. A registered voter among youths 24 
years of  age or under is more likely to be  mature and will  conduct 
himself on the job in a fashion consistent with this maturity.  VOTE 
equals one’for registered voters, zero for those old enough to vote but 
not registered, and .52 for those not old enough to be registered (32 
is the fraction of registered voters in the sample among those who are 
old enough to vote). 
Respondents in the NBER survey were asked to rate on a scale of 
very easy (l), somehwat easy (2), difficult (3), or impossible (4), how 
hard it would be to find each of six potential jobs: factory laborer, office 
clerk, check-out clerk in a supermarket, cleaning up neighborhoods, 
working at a fast-food place, and working at any job at the minimum 
wage. The question was asked of both employed and unemployed youth. 
A variable DFZNDJ  representing the perceived difficulty of  finding a 
job has been constructed as the sum of the numerical answers to these 
six  questions.  Thus, the possible range for DFZNDJ  is  from  6, for 
respondents who answered “very easy” to each job question, to 24, 
for respondents who answered “impossible”  six times. The mean of 
DFZNDJ in the sample is 12.56 with a standard deviation of 3.14. This 
finding implies that the typical member of  the sample did not regard 
the entry-level labor market as being particularly tight. On the other 
hand, youths did believe that it was more difficult to find office clerk 277  Do Better Jobs Make Better Workers? 
and factory laborer jobs which they probably regarded as the more 
attractive possibilities among those listed. Other things equal, we would 
expect people with low values of DFZNDJ to be more careless about 
losing their jobs than people with high values (those who believe jobs 
are hard to find). 
The final personal background variable to be defined is ED, which 
is simply equal to years of schooling completed. ED has a mean value 
in the sample of  10.9 and a standard deviation of  1.5. The sign that 
should be expected for the relationship between ED and absenteeism 
is not obvious. If the predominant effect of  ED in the equation is to 
proxy positive personality traits, then it should be negatively correlated 
with absenteeism. On the other hand, if  people with more education 
are treated more permissively or have more and better job opportunities 
than those with less education, then they may be absent more often 
because they are less afraid of losing their jobs, other factors held 
constant. 
If absenteeism can lead to involuntary dismissal, which our estimates 
suggest is likely, one might  expect  a negative  relationship  between 
absenteeism and tenure on the job, with the causal link running from 
absenteeism to tenure. But there is also reason to believe that workers 
with longer job tenure may be less dispensable and therefore less likely 
to be fired for any given level of absenteeism. In addition, workers 
with longer tenure  on a job (particularly  those  who have passed  a 
probationary period) are likely to be governed by more lenient work 
rules. Both of  these factors imply a positive relationship between ab- 
senteeism and tenure, and therefore, both TENURE and TENURESQ 
have been included in estimated equations. 
TENURE is the length of employment on the most recent job and is 
measured in months. It has a mean of 7.3 and a standard deviation of 
10.6. We  acknowledge the possibility of simultaneity bias resulting from 
the effect of  absenteeism on involuntary dismissal.  Nevertheless, to 
the extent that the estimated effect of  TENURE on absenteeism is 
significant and positive in the results reported below, the negative bias 
is probably minimal. It is also the case, however, that individuals with 
very short  job tenure may be more likely to answer that they are “never 
absent” simply because they have not been on the job long enough for 
their underlying propensities to become evident. 
7.4  Determinants of  Absenteeism: Estimated Results 
7.4.1  Estimation Method 
As discussed earlier, the measure of  absenteeism used as the de- 
pendent variable in this study is derived from answers to the following 278  Ronald Ferguson/Randall Filer 
question: On your most recent job, “how  often would you say you 
miss(ed) a day for other reasons besides  being sick?”  Respondents 
were asked to answer: “often,”  “rarely,”  “sometimes,”  or “never.” 
The young men in our sample are the 71 percent of the NBER sample 
who had at least one period of regular employment lasting ten days or 
longer during the year preceding the interview. Of that 71 percent, the 
number responding with each of the four possible answers is given in 
table 7.2. Taking into account that the question excludes sickness as a 
reason for skipping work, the distribution of answers seems plausible. 
In order for ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regressions to yield best- 
linear unbiased estimates, the assumptions of the Gauss-Markov theo- 
rem that the error term has an expected value of zero and constant 
variance must be satisfied. The theorem fails for qualitative and ordinal 
dependent variables that fall into a small number of discrete ordered 
categories. Given the assumption that there is some underlying con- 
tinuous dependent variable that has been partitioned  in a monotonic 
way and assigned to a small number of discrete categories, OLS regres- 
sions will generally produce statistically inconsistent estimates of the 
marginal effects of  independent variables, appropriately adjusted for 
scale. Recognizing this, we have chosen to report both OLS and or- 
dered probit estimates for the effects of the independent variables on 
ab~enteeism.~ 
7.4.2  Estimated Results 
Table 7.3 reports the results for the various estimates. The answers 
“often,”  “sometimes,”  “rarely,”  and “never”  were grouped in three 
different combinations for probit estimation. The combination reported 
in the second column of  table 7.3 takes each of the four as separate 
and is called PROBZT4.  PROBZT3  pools  “often”  and  “sometimes” 
into one category, while keeping “rarely” and “never”  separate. The 
last column, PROBZR, reports results for a binary probit  in  which 
“rarely” or “never” and “often” or “sometimes”  are the two group- 
Table 7.2  Sample Frequencies for Job Behaviors 
Absenteeism  Absenteeism 
not Due to  Due to 
Illness  Illness  Tardiness 
Number  Percent  Number  Percent  Number  Percent 
Often  29  1.8%  35  2.2%  47  3.0% 
Sometimes  138  8.7%  190  12.0%  218  13.8% 
Rarely  439  27.7%  547  34.5%  511  32.3% 
Never  978  61.7%  812  51.2%  808  5 1  .O% 
Nore: N = 1584 279  Do Better Jobs Make Better Workers? 
ings. Because of differences in scaling, the magnitudes of the coefficient 
estimates are not directly comparable across columns. 
Examination of table 7.3 shows that the coefficient estimates are 
generally twice their standard errors and that, with a couple of inter- 
esting and explainable exceptions, the pattern of signs is what would 
be intuitively expected. 
Let us concentrate first on the estimates for the focal job quality 
measures: HRSAL, STATUS, and SPECSKILL. These estimates tell 
an interesting and believable  story.  In a nutshell, they  suggest that 
youths in the sample value money and status and are better employees 
the more money and status their jobs afford them, other things equal. 
At least as far as absenteeism is concerned there is no evidence that 
the income effect of  higher wages dominates the substitution effect. 
Table 7.3 
Independent Variable  OLS  PROBIT4  PROBIT3  PROBIT2 
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Note: The magnitudes of  the  estimates are not  directly comparable across columns 
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Similarly, the positive terms in equation (4) showing the effect of status 
on absenteeism appear empirically to dominate the negative terms. In 
jobs, however, in which the industry retention rate (and hence SPEC- 
SKILL) is high, young men in the sample were more inclined to be 
absent than on jobs that, in this dimension, would appear to be less 
attractive. 
Theoretically, the most reasonable alternative interpretation of the 
results found here is that the estimated coefficients on HRSAL, STA- 
TUS, and SPECSKZLL reflect not the impact of job characteristics on 
employee behavior, but rather the impact of unobserved personality 
traits. If  the market has efficiently sorted the worst workers into the 
worst jobs and the best workers into the best jobs, and if there exist 
unmeasured dimensions of worker quality that because of this sorting 
are highly correlated with job quality, then statistically significant coef- 
ficients for the job quality measures might indicate only the effects of 
these omitted personal characteristics. The weight of evidence, how- 
ever, is inconsistent with this hypothesis, while being highly consistent 
with the hypothesis that job characteristics influence worker behavior. 
Three distinct arguments can be given to support the contention that 
job quality, not personal characteristics, is responsible for the results. 
First, if  the estimated results reflect solely an efficient sorting of 
better and worse employees into more and less attractive jobs, the 
highly significant coefficient found for SPECSKZLL has the wrong sign. 
Simple  correlations  of  the  characteristics  of  the  respondents  with 
SPECSKZLL  indicate that  those youths with high values  of  SPEC- 
SKILL are the “higher quality” youths. For example, SPECSKZLL is 
positively and significantly correlated with grades, employment among 
the individual’s peers, wages, status, the youth’s assessment of how 
satisfied he is with the job, and the tendency to avoid illegal sources 
of income. Since even the simple correlation between SPECSKZLL and 
absenteeism is positive, the estimated impact of SPECSKZLL on ab- 
senteeism should not be a statistical artifact resulting from, for example, 
some complex form of multicollinearity. Nor does time preference ex- 
plain this behavior, unless one is willing to make the counterintuitive 
assumption that workers with the least concern for the future are the 
most likely to take jobs with high industry retention rates. 
Various  theoretical explanations for why  high  levels  of  industry- 
specific skills might lead to higher absenteeism were spelled out above 
in section 7.2.2 (Case 3). The theoretical reasons suggested there were 
that either the marginal effect  of  absenteeism on the probability of 
being punished  or involuntarily dismissed from the job is smaller in 
occupations with high levels of industry-specific skills, or that the av- 
erage difference between the current job and the next best alternative 
(UZa  - UZb)  is smaller in those occupations. Employment in a job that 281  Do Better Jobs Make Better Workers? 
requires or teaches an industry-specific skill, or that gives the job holder 
a credential that leads to long-term association with an industry, also 
gives the job holder greater general security. Hence, the results found 
here suggest that greater security may lead to higher rates of absenteeism. 
The second argument in support of the interpretation that job quality 
and not unobserved personal characteristics gives rise to the results 
found here is that  the coefficient estimates for the focal job quality 
measures are extremely robust to changes in the specification of the 
estimated equation. If omitting important unobserved or unmeasurable 
worker traits  created  seriously biased  estimates of  the effect of job 
quality on absenteeism, then these estimates should be very sensitive 
to the inclusion or exclusion of personality and background variables 
that would also be correlated with the omitted variables. In fact, the 
estimated coefficients of HRSAL, STATUS, and SPECSKILL are very 
stable. Including in  an OLS regression the 20  additional personality 
and individual background variables that should have been highly cor- 
related with any possible source of omitted-variable bias changed the 
estimated coefficients for HRSAL, STATUS,  and SPECSKILL from 
-.018,  -.0034,  and .72, respectively, to -.017,  -.0037,  and .88. 
The third and perhaps most convincing argument that the estimated 
relationship between job characteristics and absenteeism is not due to 
omitted variables comes from analyzing tardiness, absenteeism due to 
illness, and involuntary dismissals. Of the entire sample of almost 1,600 
youths who were employed at the time of  the interview or who had 
been employed at some time during the past year, 90 were not employed 
at the time of. the interview because they  had  been  “discharged  or 
fired” from their last regular job. 
The model presented earlier posits that the possibility of being fired 
is one of  the primary disincentives to absenteeism. According to the 
model, the greater the probability of being fired for a marginal increase 
in absenteeism, the less the employee will  choose to be absent. Sim- 
ilarly, given that absenteeism could cause the employee to face a higher 
probability of being fired, employees will choose to be absent less often, 
the greater the relative benefits of remaining employed on the current 
job. 
To  confirm that absenteeism does increase the probability of being 
fired, we conducted a simple binary probit analysis, in which the de- 
pendent variable was set equal to zero if  the respondent was either 
employed at the time of the survey or had lost his last job for reasons 
other than firing or dismissal, and equal to one for those who had been 
fired or dismissed from their most  recent job. Table 7.4 reports  the 
results of this analysis. 
Examination of the results shows that, as expected, the probability 
of being out of work because of dismissal or firing was lower for those 282  Ronald FergusodRandall Filer 
Table 7.4  Binary Probit Results for Dismissed or Fired as the Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variable  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Absenteeism  Not 
Due to Illness 
Absenteeism 









-  .057 
-  .0053 
-  .76 
.46 
who were absent less or who had “better” jobs. Tardiness, on the other 
hand, did not affect the probability of  being fired. If  the hypothesis 
that job quality is correlated with absenteeism because of behavioral 
responses  to the probability  of  being fired (rather than because job 
quality is capturing the influence of  unmeasured personal character- 
istics) is correct, then tardiness, because it does not affect the prob- 
ability of being fired, should not be affected by the attractiveness of 
the job. 
Table 7.5 presents four-category ordered probit estimates for absen- 
teeism not due to illness (already seen in table 7.3), absenteeism due 
to illness, and tardiness, using identical right-hand-side variables. The 
striking result of this analysis is the difference between the degree of 
relationship of tardiness to the job quality measures (HRSAL,  STATUS, 
and SPECSKILL) and that of the two forms of absenteeism to these 
measures. Tardiness is far less closely linked to job quality. The ex- 
istence of several statistically significant coefficient estimates for other 
variables in the equation suggests that this lack of statistical significance 
is not caused by poor data on the dependent variable tardiness. The 
coefficient estimates for the other variables in the equations indicate 
that most individual characteristics affect tardiness in much the same 
way as they affect absenteeism. 
If  the coefficients for HRSAL, STATUS, and SPECSKILL in  the 
equation for absenteeism not due to illness were capturing hidden ef- 
fects of personality  rather than a behavioral response to job charac- 
teristics, the estimated coefficients for these three variables should be 
much larger and statistically significant in the equation for tardiness, 
paralleling those in the absenteeism equations. The fact that they are 
not provides strong support for the interpretation that  job quality affects 
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Table 7.5  Estimated Results of Four-Category Ordered Probit for 
Comparisons of Absenteeism and Tardiness 
Dependent Variable 
Absenteeism  Absenteeism 
Not Due to  Due to 
Independent Variable  Illness  Illness  Tardiness 
CONSTANT  -  3.20  -  2.84 
(.32)  (  .30) 
HRSAL  -  .033  -  ,009 
(.020)  (.015) 
STATUS  -  ,0054  -  ,0037 
(.0024)  (.0022) 
SPECSKILL  1.21  0.59 
(38)  (.37) 
BOSSBIAS  .I3  ,045 
(.08)  (.077) 
COMMUTE  .W32  .0037 
(.OO 13)  (3012) 
ILLEGAL  .25  .10 
(.09)  (.09) 
GRADES  -  .057  -  ,015 
(.024)  (.022) 
VOTE  -  .16  -  ,051 
(.07)  (.069) 
DFINDJ  -  .015  ,004 
(.010)  (.009) 
ED  .067  .006 
(.023)  (.021) 
(.012)  (.011) 
TENURESQ  -  .00086  -  ,0014 
(.00036)  (.0003) 
TENURE  .05 1  .080 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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the interpretation that attributes statistically significant job quality es- 
timates to omitted personal characteristics is inconsistent with the avail- 
able evidence. 
The reasons to expect positive or negative signs on the other vari- 
ables in the equation for absenteeism were discussed above when these 
variables  were  defined. The signs for BOSSBIAS, COMMUTE, IL- 
LEGAL, GRADES, VOTE, and DFINDJ were straightforward to pre- 
dict and have turned out precisely as expected. The results for BOSS- 
BIAS, COMMUTE, and DFINDJ, like those for HRSAL, STATUS, 
and SPECSKILL, are further evidence for the influence of incentives 284  Ronald FergusodRandall Filer 
on absenteeism. The results for DFINDJ are particularly interesting. 
Apparently, other things equal, workers who think jobs are hard to find 
do not as often engage in behavior (such as absenteeism) that might 
cause them to lose the jobs they have. 
All four equations presented in table 7.3 show a positive estimate 
for the impact of increased education on absenteeism. This finding may 
be symbolic of the fact that workers with more education are more 
secure in their jobs. It is almost certainly true that they  have lower 
values for (Uza - Uz6),  because education is such an important screen- 
ing device used  by employers. Paradoxically for employers, youths 
with  more education may  tend  to take advantage of the employer’s 
presumption that they will be more reliable.  lo It is therefore interesting 
to note that table 7.5 shows no evidence of a link between education 
and tardiness or absenteeism due to illness.  This pattern of  results 
makes perfect sense if employers are less tolerant of absenteeism among 
those with less education, or if those with less education try harder to 
avoid being fired because the alternative  jobs available to them are less 
attractive, giving them a higher value of (Uzu - UZb).Il 
7.5  The Magnitude of the Estimated Effects 
The previous section discussed the signs and statistical significance 
of the coefficients on the variables used to explain absenteeism among 
the members of the NBER sample. It also presented several reasons 
for believing that the results reflect actual causal factors rather than 
statistical artifacts. This section will discuss the magnitude of the effects 
of job quality and personal factors on absenteeism. 
The principal finding is that the effects of job quality and personal 
characteristics are both substantial and of similar orders of magnitude. 
The first two tables in this section present a general method of analyzing 
the magnitude of the effects of the several variables. Both show changes 
in the probability of different levels of absenteeism that result  from 
changing a  single independent variable  from one standard deviation 
below its mean to one standard deviation above its mean, while holding 
all other independent variables constant at their means. Table 7.6 uses 
estimates from the PROBIT4  regression,  while table 7.7 uses those 
from the PROBIT2 regression. 
The numbers in the headings of table 7.6 are the estimated proba- 
bilities from PROBIT4 for each of the four categories, when each of 
the explanatory variables is equal to its mean value. The means and 
standard deviations for the explanatory variables are given in the last 
column. There are three numbers at each independent variable’s  in- 
tersection with each absenteeism category. The top number among the 
three is the probability of the corresponding  absenteeism answer, such 285  Do Better Jobs Make Better Workers? 
Table 7.6  The Sensitivity of the Probabilities from the Four-Category 
Ordered Probit to Changes in the Independent Variables 
Probability at x  = f,  for all x's 
Often  Sometimes  Rarely  Never  Mean 
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Note: On each line, all independent variables are at their means except for the variable 
on the line  under examination. In each set of  three statistics, the first measures the 
probability of the column's answer (often, sometimes, rarely, or never) when the variable 
on the line is one standard deviation above its mean; the second measures the probability 
when the variable is one standard deviation below its mean; and the third measures the 
difference between the first two, as a percentage of the column probability, when the 
column probability is calculated with all independent variables at their means. 
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as “sometimes”, when the variable listed on the respective row, (such 
as COMMUTE), is set at one standard deviation above its mean and 
all other independent variables  are equal to their  means.  Thus, for 
example, the estimated probability that the answer “sometimes” would 
have been given by a respondent who was “average,”  except for the 
fact that his commute was one standard deviation longer than the “av- 
erage”  respondent’s, is  .0982. The second line gives the probability 
(.0737) that he would have said “sometimes”  if, instead, his commute 
had been one standard deviation below the mean of COMMUTE. The 
number on the third line is formed by subtracting the number on the 
second line from the one on the first and then dividing by the probability 
(given at the heading to the column) of  the relevant answer (“some- 
times”)  with all variables  (including COMMUTE) set equal to their 
means. Thus, the third statistic is a measure of the predicted percentage 
change in the probability of the corresponding answer for a shift of the 
independent variable from one standard deviation below its mean to 
one standard deviation above. For COMMUTE, a move from one stand- 
ard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above causes 
the probability of the answer “sometimes”  to increase by 29 percent 
of the probability of this response when evaluated at mean values. 
Table 7.7 summarizes the quantitative importance of the changes in 
the independent variables, using the PROBIT2 estimates. With all vari- 
ables  at their  means,  the predicted  probability  of  “sometimes”  or 
“often” from PROBIT2 is .0885. Each entry in the first column of the 
table gives the equivalent probability when the other variables remain 
at their means but the variable on its row is one standard deviation 
above its mean. The second column provides the related probability 
for the variable at one standard deviation below its mean. The third 
column equals the value in the first column minus the value in  the 
second; and the fourth column gives the value in the third as a per- 
centage of the probability at the sample mean, .0885. 
Tables 7.6 and 7.7 both show that job and personal characteristics 
can be quantitatively important in determing the level of absenteeism. 
Movements from one standard deviation below the mean to one stand- 
ard deviation above the mean in various characteristics typically change 
the probability of frequent (“often” or “sometimes”) absenteeism by 
25 to 75 percent of its value when all variables are at the sample mean. 
The fundamental point demonstrated is that incentive-related indices 
(including the job characteristics, as well as COMMUTE and DFZNDJ) 
have effects on absenteeism that are of a comparable order of magnitude 
to those of personal characteristics,  such as ILLEGAL, VOTE, and 
GRADES. 
A more intuitive understanding  of  how the probability  of frequent 
absenteeism varies as a function of changes in the independent variables 
can be gained from examining tables 7.8 and 7.9. Table 7.7  Effects of Changes in the Independent Variables on Frequent Absenteeism, Based on 
Binary Probit 
Independent  Difference as 
Variable  Pr for f  + S.D.  Pr for f - S.D.  Difference  % of Pr for X  Mean  (STD) 
HRSAL  ,0643  .I190  -  ,0547  62  3.90  (2.14) 
STATUS  .0571  ,1314  -  .0743  83  23.4  (16.1) 
SPECSKILL  .1271  .0594  .0677  76  .522  (.09) 
BOSSBIAS  .lo38  .0749  .0289  33  .207  (.376) 
COMMUTE  .I038  .0749  ,0289  33  29.2  (22.7) 
GRADES  .0764  .I020  -  .0256  29  4.04  (1.35) 
ILLEGAL  .lo20  .0764  ,0256  29  ,143  (.35) 
VOTE  ,0735  ,1056  -  ,0321  36  .52  ~42) 
DFINDJ  .0735  .I056  -  .0321  36  12.6  (3.14) 
ED  .0808  ,0968  -  .01m  18  10.9  (1.52) 
Note: Frequent absenteeism equals the responses “often”  or “sometimes.”  The probability  for 8 =  ,0885. 
STD = standard deviation. 288  Ronald FergusodRandall Filer 
Table 7.8  Probabilities of Frequent Absenteeism, Based on Binary Probit, 
for Selected Job and Worker Characteristics 
Job or Worker Characteristic 
Independent 

























































































































,095  I 
Column  .I335  .2776  .0655  .0028 
Probability 
Note: Frequenr absenteeism equals the responses “sometimes”  or “often.” 
For variables in each row, variables in the other rows are set at the sample mean. 
Column probabilities are evaluated using all values in the column except that for HRSAL 
(w)  from the second row; the value for HRSAL is taken from the first row.  Values in 
this table may not be representative of variation within the sample. 289  Do Better Jobs Make Better Workers? 
Each row of table 7.8 presents four selected values of the associated 
independent variable. Beneath each value is the probability of frequent 
absenteeism (derived from the PROBIT2  equation), evaluated at the 
given value of  the independent variable and the sample mean for all 
the other independent variables. The fifth  row,  labeled  “w,  S, K,” 
shows the probabilities of frequent absenteeism when all three of  the 
variables HRSAL, STATUS, and SPECSKILL are given the value that 
holds for the occupation given in the column and when all other in- 
dependent variables are given the sample mean value. The last row of 
the table, labeled  ‘‘column probability,”  indicates the probability  of 
frequent absenteeism for a composite “person”  formed by combining 
all of the characteristics in the column (including the value of HRSAL 
given in the first row). These composites are meant to give an insight 
into the sensitivity of the analysis; any resemblance to an actual in- 
dividual is purely coincidental. 
Table 7.9 is probably the easiest to understand and the most inter- 
esting of the four tables in this section. Using “composite people,”  it 
provides a direct comparison of the relative effectiveness of changing 
job or personal characteristics in attempting to induce less absenteeism 
among young black men. Five occupations-janitors,  dishwashers, re- 
tail sales clerks, delivery  men, and a hypothetical  “good job”  with 
both HRSAL and STATUS one standard deviation above their sample 
means-are  combined with three hypothetical young men: one attrac- 
tive young man who is registered to vote, earns no illegal income, and 
was a “B” student; one who is not registered, earns no illegal icome, 
and was a “C”  student; and one who is not registered, does earn illegal 
income, and was a “C” student. Values of the other variables for these 
composite young men (COMMUTE, BOSSBIAS, DFINDJ, and ED) 
are set at sample means. 
Inspection of table 7.9 shows again that the occupational and personal 
factors are of similar quantitative importance. The youth with the worst 
personal characteristics (youth C) holding the job that most encourages 
absenteeism (janitor) would have a .2119 probability of reporting fre- 
quent absenteeism. Changing this youth to the one with the best char- 
acteristics (youth A) would reduce the predicted probability of frequent 
absenteeism to .0901. Similarly, giving youth C an attractive job (de- 
livery man) reduces his predicted probability of frequent absenteeism 
to .1075. 
A phenomenon discussed earlier and readily apparent in tables 7.8 
and 7.9 is that simply improving job quality may  not  lead to lower 
absenteeism. In particular, if  specific skill (which may proxy job se- 
curity) is increased along with wages and status, there may be offsetting 
effects, and the direction of  the impact  of  improved job quality  on 




Job Characteristics  Janitor  Dishwasher  Retail Sales  Delivery Man  High Wage and Status 
Mean HRSAL  $3.53  $3.20  $3.22  $4.51  $6.04 
STATUS  13  II  41  31  40 
SPECSKILL  .5 1  .3n  .52  .46  .52 
(KJ + STD) 
(3  + STD) 
(K) 
Probability of Frequent Absenteeism: 
Youth C  .2119  ,1539  ,1251  ,1075  .0869 
Youth A  ,0901  .0594  ,0455  ,0375  .0329 
Youth B  ,1492  ,1038  ,0833  .0694  ,0548 
Note: Frequent absenteeism equals the responses “sometimes”  or “often.” 
Youth C is not registered to vote, earns illegal income, and was a “mostly C” student. Youth B is not registered 
to vote, does not earn illegal income, and was a “mostly C” student. Youth A is registered to vote, does not 
earn illegal income, and was a “mostly  B” student. The other variables have been set equal to the sample 
means. STD = one standard deviation. 291  Do Better Jobs Make Better Workers? 
the least attractive job in table 7.9, it does not have the highest prob- 
ability of frequent absenteeism. The positive effects of increasing the 
wages and status of a dishwasher when he moves to being a janitor are 
more than offset by the negative impact of higher SPECSKZLL. 
7.6  Summary and Conclusions 
Few readers, if  any, will be  surprised at the extent to which per- 
sonal factors have been  shown by this  study to,  affect absenteeism. 
The study’s findings  simply confirm widely  held  beliefs  about  this 
problem. The main finding that may challenge the usual assumptions 
is that the labor market behavior of  black youths is significantly af- 
fected by job-related incentives, including aspects of job quality. These 
effects are complex, and whether improving job quality leads to more 
or less absenteeism depends on the specific manner in which quality 
is improved. 
The empirical findings of  the study strongly support the view that 
inner-city black youths behave rationally and that they can, therefore, 
be  induced  to modify their behavior by appropriately designed  and 
targeted incentives, both  “carrots”  and “sticks”.  The main “stick” 
in the labor market under analysis is the possibility of being involun- 
tarily dismissed (fired) for unsatisfactory  behavior. Absenteeism was 
found to increase the probability of being fired, while tardiness has 
essentially  no impact  on  the probability  of  being fired.  Hence,  al- 
though tardiness may not go unnoticed, it does not carry nearly as 
heavy a potential  penalty  as absenteeism. Accordingly, youths with 
higher-status,  higher-wage jobs  that  they  should  want  to keep  are 
absent less often than those on poorer jobs, but they are tardy just 
as frequently. 
An  interesting  and important finding is that in  one aspect of job 
quality,  improvement  apparently diminshes  a youth’s fear of  being 
fired  and  therefore  leads  to  more  absenteeism.  This  is  the  aspect 
measured by SPECSKZLL, which represents the probability that the 
worker  will  be  in  the  same industry  five years  in  the future.  The 
increased level of  industry attachment associated with higher values 
of SPECSKZLL is presumed to reflect industry-specific skills and cre- 
dentials  that  both  increase  the  value  of  the  worker  to his  current 
employer (reducing the likelihood of firing for some worker behaviors) 
and  facilitate  mobility from firm to firm  within  the industry.  Other 
things equal, a worker with higher SPECSKZLL not  only should be 
less likely to be fired for a given level of absenteeism, but also should 
experience  shorter durations  of  involuntary  unemployment  and,  if 
discharged, be more likely to find a job of  similar quality to that of 292  Ronald FergusodRandall Filer 
the job he lost. Thus, it is perfectly rational for workers in what are 
essentially less dead-end jobs to be absent more often than their coun- 
terparts  in jobs  that  teach  fewer  skills  and  confer  less  valuable 
credentials. 
Just as the fear of being fired seems to be less effective in discour- 
aging absenteeism among youths who have more industry-specific skills 
and who presumably would have less trouble acquiring new employ- 
ment, the fear of job loss appears to be a more effective deterrent the 
more difficult the individual thinks it  will be to find alternative em- 
ployment. The variable DFZNDJ  (which measures this expected dif- 
ficulty) is estimated to have a significant effect on whether the youth 
is frequently absent. Simple correlations show that DFZNDJ is greater 
among youths with low scores on background  and personal indices, 
who in turn should be less attractive to employers. In the same vein, 
years of education, which is often viewed as a sign of worker quality, 
has a small but significant positive impact on absenteeism; however, 
this relationship  may  reflect a sample-selection problem  inherent in 
the NBER data. 
Because  incentives  seem  to work  so powerfully,  the design  and 
targeting of inducements to greater worker reliability is a tricky pro- 
cess. Program operators may be disappointed to find that unless care- 
fully structured, supposedly better opportunities may actually lead to 
less desirable behavior. What is needed, then, are policy approaches 
that offer attractive opportunities along with strict mechanisms to hold 
youths accountable for their performance. This might involve a well- 
coordinated evaluation and referral system through which past  per- 
formance could have a direct link to future opportunities. 
There are other important issues that we, as economists, less typi- 
cally discuss but that are centrally related to the topic under analysis. 
These involve the relationship between the inner-city black youth and 
his employer. As previously mentioned, the variable in the estimated 
equations called BOSSBZAS measured whether the youth believed his 
supervisor showed bias against individuals on some basis other than 
how well they performed their jobs. Twenty percent of the youths in 
the sample believed that their bosses showed such a bias. BOSSBZAS 
was estimated to have a significant impact on absenteeism, with a youth 
who believed his boss to be biased having had a 50 percent greater 
probability of being frequently absent than one who did not hold such 
a belief (see table 7.8). The relationship of  this variable to tardiness 
was even stronger (see table 7.5). Some of this effect may, of  course, 
be the result of youths with poor behavior eliciting strong responses 
from their supervisors, thereby causing the youths to feel that they are 
being “picked on.”  Whichever the dominant direction of causality in 
this relationship, given strong preconceptions on both sides, there may 293  Do Better Jobs Make Better Workers? 
be a large element of a self-fulfilling prophesy at work here. In any 
event, these findings strongly suggest that the employer-employee re- 
lationship should be a fruitful topic for both further research and em- 
ployer and community action. 
The estimated  results showed several direct relationships  between 
personal characteristics and absenteeism, each with the expected sign. 
Youths with over $50 of illegal income in the past year were estimated 
to be one and one-half times more likely to be absent frequently than 
those who did not have  such income  (see table  7.8). Although  this 
finding may, in part, represent the opportunity costs of time spent at 
work, it is more likely to be a proxy for the type of individual and his 
value system. Grades and voter registration were other personal char- 
acteristics that strongly predicted employee dependability. The results 
of this study suggest that grades may be a more reliable criterion by 
which to screen  job applicants than the more commonly used criterion 
of  the level of education attained. 
Finally, we turn to the issue of unemployment.  Lowering the extent 
of absenteeism among inner-city black youths may ultimately lead to 
a substantial reduction in their level of unemployment. It is unlikely, 
however, that a change in the frequency of involuntary dismissals will 
be an important contributing factor. Although the probability of being 
fired is significantly related to absenteeism, dismissals in the NBER 
sample accounted for a relatively small percentage (less than 15 per- 
cent) of separations. Further, if  the probability of having been “fired 
from the last job” for youths in the sample who were absent “often” 
or “sometimes”  had been equal to the lower probability experienced 
by those who were absent “rarely”  or “never,”  the fraction of the 
sample that was not employed at the time of the interview would have 
been only 0.6 percent lower. This effect is clearly negligible in light of 
the fact that 60 percent of those who had worked at some point in the 
past year were not employed (either unemployed or not desirous of 
employment) at the time of the survey. 
If a change in the level of absenteeism, or in behavior more generally, 
is to affect the level of unemployment among these youths, it will be 
by improving their attractiveness to potential employers and thereby 
their position in the hiring queue. If stronger incentives for good be- 
havior are developed and maintained, and good referral mechanisms 
are implemented so that those who have been dependable employees 
can be easily identified by potential employers, our research indicates 
that inner-city black youths will respond to these incentives by becom- 
ing more reliable employees. And if  they become more reliable, em- 
ployers will be encouraged to hire them for better jobs, thereby setting 
in  motion  a  potential  upward  spiral  in  these  youths’ employment 
opportunities. 294  Ronald FergusodRandall Filer 
Notes 
I.  Crude measures of absenteeism can be computed from Current Population Survey 
(CPS) data. Specifically, those individuals who usually worked 35 or more hours a week 
at ajob  but who, in the survey week, worked fewer than 35 hours were asked the reason 
for this discrepancy. In the May 1979 CPS extract (for a time period roughly coincident 
with that in the NBER survey), 1.5 percent of adult white men, 1.9 percent of adult 
black men, 2.0 percent of young white men, and 3.0 percent of young black men reported 
working a short week for personal, nonillness reasons. Given the sample sizes involved, 
these percentages represent a differentially high absenteeism rate for young black men 
that is highly statistically significant. The CPS data are not sufficiently well measured 
to support a statistical study of the causes of these intergroup differences. 
2.  Simultaneity bias resulting from causation running from current absenteeism to 
job characteristics is not a problem, since the observed absenteeism occurred after the 
job was acquired, while tenure in the sample was typically so short that it is unlikely 
that many respondents had either received or failed to receive wage increases or pro- 
motions based on their current  job performance (including their absenteeism record). 
3.  Previous studies include Allen (1981~  and 1981b), Ehrenberg (1970), Reza (1975), 
Thomas (1980), and Winkler (1980). Most studies of absenteeism have been done by 
psychologists or management scientists, who generally attribute absenteeism to  job dis- 
satisfaction and the inadequacy of specific personnel policies (see Steers and Rhodes 
1978). Although the theoretical approaches in these studies provide useful insights, they 
leave many of the questions that economists ask unanswered. 
4.  For an analysis of absenteeism that also relys on the rigidity of contracted wages 
and conditions of employment, see Reza (1975). 
5.  Obviously, this value represents a combination of the expected values from the best 
available alternative  job and unemployment along with the probabilities of these two states. 
6.  The prevalence in such jobs of inconsistent and arbitrary personnel practices is 
frequently also mentioned. Although we will not discuss this aspect of menial jobs in 
the formal model, it is at least partially captured in the empirical analysis that follows 
by a variable measuring perceived bias on the part of the worker’s supervisor. 
7.  It should be acknowledged here that the “environment”  of a “good” job and the 
hope and  self-respect  such a job may engender in the worker  might  cause tastes to 
change. If  this is the case, the tools of  economic analysis, including the comparative 
statics that follow, may fall short of achieving their purpose. 
8.  It should be noted that higher industry retention rates do not necessarily imply 
longer tenure with any given employer. 
9. Readers unfamiliar with the ordered probit estimation technique are referred to 
McKelvey and Zaroina (1975). 
10.  Nonetheless, we can offer no good reason why employers should hold onto such 
a presumption in the face of experience to the contrary. 
11.  An alternative explanation, discussed by others working with the NBER sample 
(see Bound  1983) is that education in the sample is highly correlated with age and that 
“good,”  older workers have moved out of the sample areas (the poverty tracts) because 
they have succeeded, leaving only the “poorer,”  older youths (and younger teenagers 
of all qualities) remaining behind to be included in the sample. 
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COmment  Charles Brown 
Conclusive research on the effects of job characteristics on labor mar- 
ket outcomes has often proven difficult, both because the relevant job 
characteristics are difficult to measure and because the issue of omitted 
worker characteristics keeps arising. Ferguson and Filer’s conclusions 
about the effects of job characteristics  on absenteeism  are therefore 
likely to be controversial.  Their analysis of the effects of measured 
worker characteristics is less controversial, but no less interesting. 
Charles  Brown  is associate  professor of economics,  University  of  Maryland,  and 
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The theoretical  section  of  the paper  investigates  the comparative 
static effects of changes in a job’s wage, status, and level of industry- 
specific human capital (K)  on absenteeism. This investigation requires 
some armchair psychology, since cross-partial derivatives of the utility 
function are usually required. But since the theme of this section is the 
ambiguity of the theoretical results and since that theme is amply jus- 
tified for wages and status, one’s reservations here (does additional 
status really reduce the marginal utility of money income?) are not very 
important. The effect of increasing industry-specific human capital seems 
to me more controversial. 
The sign of this effect depends on three effects of  K. It depends 
positively  on  ULK,  the effect  of K on the marginal utility of leisure; 
negatively  on PLK,  the effect of K  on the marginal  impact of leisure 
(that is, absenteeism) on the probability  of discharge; and negatively 
on (UZu - U2b)K, the effect  of  K  on the utility  difference  between 
holding  the current job and  finding another job in  the next  period. 
Ferguson and Filer argue that more-skilled jobs are more pleasant, so 
ULK  is negative; that employers lose more from firing skilled workers, 
so PLK  is negative; and that K gives the worker the ability to move to 
other  jobs in the same industry, so (holding the current wage constant) 
(UZu  - U2b)K  is negative. 
I  find the last two arguments, and particularly their juxtaposition, 
somewhat puzzling.  If the skills in question are readily  transferrable 
within an industry, workers should pay the full cost of training, and 
there is no extra cost to the firm from firing absentee workers. Alter- 
natively, ifddischarging an absentee worker would be costly to the firm, 
it  should pay  a  wage  somewhat above the alternative wage to dis- 
courage absenteeism and reduce discharges. I suspect that the solution 
to the puzzle lies in what is happening when we compare workers with 
different levels of industry-specific human capital but equal wages. If 
the worker with less industry-specific human capital has better luck 
rather than more general capital,  Ferguson and Filer’s  view may be 
correct: K  would have an element of firm specificity, which explains 
the reluctance to discharge a worker who has it, and an element of 
transferability, which luck presumably lacks. 
Even then, the reluctance-to-discharge argument may be weak. Sup- 
pose one plots P, the probability of discharge, against L, the extent of 
absenteeism. Such a curve would be upward  sloping. Now compare 
the two curves, for different levels of K. The assertion that PLK  is 
negative says that the P(L) curve will be flatter with more K.  But P(L) 
should be zero at low levels of L,  and equal to one at very high levels 
of  L, for any value  of  K. If  the two P(L) curves coincide  at zero 
absenteeism and at extreme absenteeism, it is impossible for one curve 
to be uniformly flatter than the other. If one interprets P as the prob- 
ability of discharge for all causes, then P(L)  is probably lower for those 297  Do Better Jobs Make Better Workers? 
with specific human capital at low levels of L but roughly the same 
(that is, one) at high levels of L. In this case, P(L)  could be uniformly 
lower for the worker with more K,  but again could not be uniformly 
flatter (indeed, it could be uniformly steeper). 
M-y skepticism about the authors’ analysis on this point should not 
be overstated. I read their discussion to say that, on a priori grounds, 
greater industry-specific human capital could quite plausibly increase 
absenteeism. My own prior is that such a response is perhaps possible, 
but certainly not likely. 
In the transition from theory to evidence, the measurement of the 
variables  used  becomes  important. The NBER survey data contain 
some very  interesting  information  here; it  is used  well and supple- 
mented by two indices based on the respondents’ occupation, the Dun- 
can socioeconomic status score and the industry retention rate of the 
occupation. The authors interpret the latter as a measure of industry- 
rather than firm-specific skill. I am not certain that this interpretation 
is warranted, especially since in the NLS youth sample over 80 percent 
of the industry stayers were firm stayers (Brown 1982, 44, n. 13). 
The empirical results are very interesting. The virtues of a special- 
purpose survey are evident in the wide range of variables not available 
to previous researchers. One very striking result is the list of variables 
that proved unrelated to absenteeism. Perhaps the most surprising of 
these are age and marital status, because both  are regarded  by  em- 
ployers as signs of dependability. 
Among the variables that do matter, the results for personal attributes 
are strikingly in line with expectations, except for education (and I find 
Ferguson and Filer’s explanation more plausible than any alternative 
I can invent). Among the job characteristics, wage and status reduce 
absenteeism, while the perception that one’s boss is biased and com- 
muting distance increase it. All  these findings are in line with one’s 
expectations, though  the findings for wage and  status could not  be 
proven in a formal sense. Increasing the industry-specific human capital 
measure increases the absenteeism rate. As I have indicated above, I 
am not  comfortable  with this result. To  be  fair, I  cannot think  of  a 
plausible after-the-fact rationalization of it. 
Are the job characteristics really job characteristics? I agree with 
the authors that the omitted-variables story does not explain the neg- 
ative effect of the industry-specific human capital measure on absen- 
teeism. I find the robustness of  the results to the addition of  many 
other personal characteristics reassuring, although I  wish the survey 
provided information on the extent of absenteeism on the previous job 
for use as a control variable. 
I am less convinced by the final argument the authors offer on the 
issue of absenteeism. They observe that personal reliability should be 
reflected in a lack of absenteeism and a lack of tardiness. On the other 298  Ronald FergusodRandall Filer 
hand, if the probability of losing one’s job because of unreliability is 
the key (unobserved) job characteristic, measured job characteristics 
will be related  to absenteeism and tardiness only to the extent that 
absenteeism and tardiness are in turn related to the probability of dis- 
charge. Ferguson and Filer find that although their job characteristics 
predict absenteeism, they do not bear much relationship to tardiness; 
moreover, though absenteeism is related to the probability of discharge, 
tardiness is not. This says that “better late than never”  is truer than 
we realized, but that “better timely than tardy” is not. Even if tardiness 
is unrelated to discharge, one still wonders why the difficulty of finding 
another job should be negatively related to tardiness (table 7.5). Thus, 
I find the tardiness results more a puzzle than a proof  that the job 
characteristics are in fact measuring just job characteristics. 
However one labels them, the job characteristics and personal at- 
tributes used in the final model do have effects on absenteeism that are 
fairly characterized as large. But since discharges are a small share of 
separations in this sample, and the effect of absenteeism on discharges 
is positive but not enormous, the effect of absenteeism on unemploy- 
ment  caused by  discharges  is “small.”  Of  course, absenteeism can 
affect unemployment in other ways: by making new jobs harder to find; 
by making the new job lower paying and hence less worth keeping; or 
by creating tensions with one’s employer that lead to “quits.”  Thus, 
Ferguson and Filer’s results do prove to be a worthwhile contribution 
to the literature on black youth unemployment. 
Taken as a whole, their study isolates quite a few important predictors 
of absenteeism and finds that several others do not matter. An inter- 
esting possibility for future research would be to compare factors con- 
sidered by employers to predict absenteeism with their actual results. 
My own impression is that age, education, and marital status are widely 
used as indicators of reliability, while grades are rarely and voter reg- 
istration never used. Such a negative relationship between employer 
practice and the findings of this study would suggest that there is much 
yet to be done to understand the economics of absenteeism. 
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